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Abstract 
The second-wave feminist critique of privacy defies the liberal opposition between the 
public-political and the private-personal. Feminist thinkers such as Hanisch, Young or Fra-
ser note that, according to this liberal conception, public institutions often keep asymmetric 
power relations between private agents away from political discussion and action. The re-
sulting subordination of some agents to others tends, therefore, to be naturalised and rede-
fined as a «personal problem». Drawing on these contributions, this article reviews the social 
and political implications of big data exploitation and questions whether personal data pro-
tection must remain a matter of «privacy self-management». It aims to show that feminist 
political theory can decidedly help to identify and tackle the root causes of what I call «data 
domination». 
 
Key Words: big data, privacy, personal data protection, feminist theory, data domination, the 
personal is political. 
 
Resumen 
La crítica feminista de segunda ola a la privacidad desafía la oposición liberal entre lo 
público-político y lo privado-personal. Pensadoras feministas como Hanisch, Young o Fraser 
señalan que, de acuerdo con esta concepción liberal, las instituciones públicas a menudo 
dejan fuera de la discusión y la acción política las relaciones de poder asimétricas entre agen-
tes privados. La resultante subordinación de unos agentes a otros tiende, por tanto, a ser 
naturalizada y redefinida como un «problema personal». Basándose en estas contribuciones, 
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cuestiona si la protección de los datos personales debe continuar siendo una cuestión de 
«auto-gestión de la privacidad». Su objetivo es mostrar que la teoría política feminista puede 
ayudar decididamente a identificar y enfrentar las causas de lo que llamo «dominación a 
través de los datos». 
Palabras clave: big data, datos masivos, privacidad, protección de los datos personales, teoría 
feminista, dominación, lo personal es político. 
INTRODUCTION 
Daily life is increasingly mediated by new information and communica-
tion technologies. The use of digital and online services is necessary to live a 
normal life in Western countries. It is unthinkable, for example, to complete 
a university degree or to perform certain jobs without using a computer, a 
mobile device or the Google search engine. Online social networks permeate 
social relations. Access to basic services such as health, banking or urban 
transport has been digitised. All this has led to a datafication of everyday ana-
logue and digital life (Baruh & Popescu, 2015). The velocity, variety and vol-
ume of data generation have increased dramatically since the late 1990s, up to 
the point of submerging society in a «big data ecosystem» (Cox & Ellsworth, 
1997; boyd & Crawford, 2011).  
Our normal actions and interactions generate great amounts of personal 
data that spread further, faster and more broadly than ever before throughout 
a space controlled by private interests (Zuboff, 2019). Data can form a com-
plex profile of our attributes, interests and preferences, but also about our 
environment and the persons who are part of it. In this sense, even if you do 
not use the services or products provided by a certain corporation, it can get 
information about you through the data other people generate by using those 
services or products, or thanks to your use of the products or services provid-
ed by related companies. By way of example, you can delete your Facebook 
account (or you can never have had one) and Facebook can still having infor-
mation about you: this is the case of «shadow profiles» (Sarigol, García & 
Schweitzer, 2014). Furthermore, data disclosing is often automatic and uncon-
scious. The case of metadata exemplifies it particularly. Due to all of this, it is 
very difficult, if not impossible, to actually prevent one’s own life from being 
recorded in data (Suárez-Gonzalo, 2017). 
As predicted by Lesk (2001), the velocity, variety and volume of big da-
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technologies draw on a new logic of data collection and analysis, which allows 
inferring latent information from datasets that isolated data do not reveal. At 
present, these techniques are necessary to decide even which of all these data 
deserve human attention. Furthermore, automatic mechanisms replace im-
portant human actions, as decision-making or the analysis and classification of 
places, objects, ideas, ways of expression and behaviours. This new «algorith-
mic culture» (Hallinan & Striphas, 2016) involves what, in terms of Federici 
(2004), would be a mechanisation of big data production and reproduction. On 
the one side, every human activity is systematically converted in data. On the 
other, humans are conceived as data production machines. But, does this 
technological development primarily contribute to social good and equality? 
Or does it privilege the interests of a few? 
Over the past few decades, a new business model focused on data exploi-
tation has emerged. Data business is an opaque sector, characterised by a high 
business concentration that has monopolised big data turning them into a 
gold mine. The so-called GAFAM corporations (Google, Apple, Facebook, 
Amazon and Microsoft) control the data market. They gather the most of the 
data that billions of people disclose every day (Tufekci, 2017). As a result, both 
the economic value and the value for social control of the data collected by 
GAFAM grew exponentially. Indeed, one of their main achievements has been 
to start addressing data as interchangeable goods, opening the markets 
boundaries into them, and so paving the path for extracting profit. A practice 
that frames in what several authors (see Harvey, 2004; Fraser, 2016; or Arruzza, 
Bhattacharya & Fraser, 2019) define as a privatising, financialised and predato-
ry form of capitalism that appropriates, rather than generates, wealth and 
income. Harvey (2004) uses the expression «accumulation by dispossession» to 
designate the mechanisms whereby this renewed expression of capitalism gets 
richer.  
Although there are symptoms of public dissatisfaction with this situation, 
individuals’ data-disclosing behaviours do not reflect it: people affirm to be 
concerned about the lack of protection of their personal data, but carry on 
disclosing their information in a seemingly carefree way, especially on social 
networks. This dissonance is known as the «privacy paradox» (Barnes, 2006). 
How should we interpret this apparent contradiction? Are people concerned 
about how big data exploitation can affect their fundamental rights to privacy 
and personal data protection? Are their behaviours due to ignorance, con-
formity or irresponsibility? Or is it perhaps a problem of impossibility to act 
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My point is that the privacy paradox is, primarily, a consequence of the 
inequality of power between citizens and those who exploit their data. While 
companies and corporations establish the rules for new communication and 
information practices, impose the data disclosing conditions through their 
«privacy policies», control the data flows and benefit from them; citizens gen-
erally do not have basic information about what happens with their data, nor 
the means to handle the situation or to escape it. I define this asymmetric 
power relation as «data domination». 
Following Pettit (1997; 2012), an agent (that can be an individual, a group 
of people or a collective or a corporation) dominates another (often individu-
al) if he or she has a power to influence the life or decisions of the other agent 
that this latter does not itself control. That is what Pettit (2012) calls a power 
of «uncontrolled interference» (also referred to as «arbitrary interference» in 
Pettit’s earlier works). This statement is still valid if the dominating agent is 
never going to make «effective» her or his power, or if the dominated agent is 
not aware of her or his vulnerability. In that line, Fraser (2012) holds that sub-
ordination is linked to the impossibility of detecting injustice. According to 
her, in a morally fair social order, everyone must have access to the same 
means and resources. To dominate another involves frustrating her or his pos-
sibilities to notice what is fair and unfair and/or to claim and act for justice. 
Thus, the lack of explicit protest should not be interpreted as an expression of 
justice. Combating injustice requires discursive resources and interpretative 
schemas that allow its identification and denounce.  
It should be noted that, the monopolistic power of data markets would 
not be possible without the black boxed condition of the algorithmic culture. 
Following Pasquale (2015), corporations and governments foster an intended 
opacity through real and legal secrecy and obfuscation. He uses the term «ag-
notology» to describe the «structural production of ignorance, its diverse 
causes and conformations, whether brought about by neglect, forgetfulness, 
myopia, extinction, secrecy, or suppression» (2015: 2). This opacity reinforces 
people’s technological disempowerment: they have the power to use technolo-
gy, but not to understand it. 
Facing this situation, the European legal framework for the fundamental 
right to personal data protection (hereinafter «PDP») ‒recognised by both the 
General Data Protection Regulation 2016/679 (hereinafter «GDPR») and the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 8 (2016/C 
202/02)‒ is based on the liberal-hegemonic conception of privacy (Baruh & 
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the most ambitious measures to fight personal data’s vulnerability. It entails 
meaningful progresses in relation to the former Directive of 1995. Nonetheless, 
I argue in the following pages that, as feminism has shown, the liberal ideal of 
privacy is unable to protect people from domination. The aim of this article is 
to show, in light of the second wave feminist critique of privacy, that the con-
ceptual framework of GDPR makes it unable for citizens to protect them-
selves from data domination. In following this objective, the text is in two 
main parts: The first one focuses on the liberal-hegemonic conception of pri-
vacy that underpins GDRP. The second one explains the second-wave femi-
nist critique of privacy and what can we learn from it in relation to data 
domination. Drawing on this reflection, I stand up for rethinking privacy and 
so personal data protection from a feminist point of view. 
LIBERAL PRIVACY: AN INTERFERENCE-PROOF BUNKER 
Traditionally, the private sphere has been opposed to the public one. On 
the one side, the public relates to the community and its concerns. Politics 
literally means the things concerning the polis. Then, preserving the public has 
been historically a responsibility of politics, which, at least since the Modern 
Age, has to do with the organisation of the government and the state. On the 
other side, the private refers to the personal, the domestic and property and 
identifies with the secret, the isolated and the hidden. Within this logic, the 
private has been traditionally excluded from public discussion and action, and 
understood as a matter of self-regulation (Mill, 1992). The limitations of this 
opposition between the public and the private spheres are discussed through-
out the following sections. 
In 1890, Warren and Brandeis famously defined the right to privacy as an 
extension of the right to «be let alone». A right «against the world», based on 
the principles of inviolability of personality or immunity of the person, and related 
to the protection of those aspects of life whose invasion supposes an injury to 
feelings. Including thoughts, emotions, unpublished productions of the intel-
lect, sayings, acts, personal relations, domestic issues, etc. According to War-
ren and Brandeis, the right to privacy finishes «upon the publication of the 
facts by the individual, or with his consent» (1890: 8). The law, so, must have 
the purpose of protecting each individual from the unwarranted invasion in 
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This negative conception of privacy (as an «inviolable» sphere) is linked 
to liberal theory, which defines freedom as non-interference (see Berlin, 1969: 
196 and Hobbes, 1994: 187). From the liberal perspective, a person is free if 
there are no interferences that modify her or his course of action. Thus, free-
dom consists in doing what one wants to do, without being forced to do so. In 
that sense, capacity is not a condition for freedom: not having the means or 
the ability to do something does not mean that one is not free to do it (Pettit, 
1997). 
If we understand freedom as the absence of interferences between each 
other’s actions, to be free is only possible in isolation. Because of that, several 
authors affirm that liberalism understands and analyses society as a sum of 
atomised individuals (see Bertomeu & Domènech, 2005). Hence, liberal free-
dom is, by definition, in conflict with social life. Nonetheless, liberal theory 
understands that, to guarantee that one’s freedom does not harm that of oth-
ers, and thus ensure other values such as security or property, living together 
requires the imposition of certain limits to individual freedom (Mill, 1992; 
Hobbes, 1994). This relates to Berlin’s (1969) «value pluralism», according to 
which the main moral values are either equally important or incommensura-
ble. This is a form of moral relativism that implies that there is no rational 
way to resolve conflicts between values. Consequently, the liberal state must 
refrain from promoting a certain ideal of good living. The problems of this 
vision have been stressed by Dworkin (2011). 
In light of this theory, privacy is the individual sphere away from many of 
the «necessary» restrictions that life in common imposes on individuals’ will 
when they participate in the public sphere. Liberal privacy is, let us say, a 
bunker of «pure» freedom, proof against interferences. The right to privacy is, 
then, a right to enjoy a personal sphere exclusively governed by the individual 
will. 
Contemporary liberalism has criticised some aspects of this traditional 
way of understanding how privacy must be protected. Some of them, as 
Etzioni (1999) denounces that privacy has a potential to conceal actions that 
may threaten public order and, particularly, security. He therefore argues for 
reinforcing the «limits» of privacy, or, in other words, the need to restrict the 
«free will» in the private sphere. Solove (2008), for his part, holds that privacy 
is a «contextual» value that should be defined on a case-by-case individual 
basis, in relation to the harm (or the benefit) caused to the individual from its 
violation. It is up to each individual to determine which aspects of the own 
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wins or loses by doing so. Regarding the protection of privacy, Solove (2013) 
proposes a form of «libertarian paternalism». Taking into account the fact 
that people’s decisions or actions to protect their private affairs are often in-
appropriate, he advocates replacing individual decision by an external imposi-
tion in those cases in which this may help to keep some aspects of people’s 
lives in private.  
As seen, Both Etzioni and Solove claim for the imposition of certain lim-
its to the individual will in the private sphere. By doing so, they nuance the 
traditional «inviolability» of privacy. Nevertheless, far from seeking alterna-
tive terms to redefine its value, they continue defining it in terms of interfer-
ence. 
Liberal privacy in GDPR 
GDPR follows the privacy self-management paradigm (Baruh & Popescu, 
2015; Solove, 2013). In other words, privacy is the underpinning value of the 
European PDP regulation, and there is a broad consensus that it should be so. 
GDPR concretises this paradigm in the notice and choice model (Schwartz, 
2013; Solove, 2013) and establishes individual consent as the mechanism individ-
uals have to protect their personal data from massive exploitation. This con-
sent has to be free, informed, specific and revocable, and it must be expressed 
clearly and unequivocally (see GDPR Arts. 4(11) and 7). Hence, the interested 
party should notice the individual which specific data is interested in collect-
ing or processing and for which specific purposes. The «data subject» must 
give her or his consent prior to the gathering and processing of the personal 
data. Nevertheless, due to the very logic of big data, it is difficult to predict 
which information could arise from the aggregate processing of a massive da-
taset. Consequently, GDPR cannot actually guarantee that individual consent 
is always «specific» and «informed» (Suárez-Gonzalo, 2017).   
Furthermore, «free» means in the Regulation that individuals cannot be 
forced to share their data (see Art. 7), i.e., that consent must be voluntary. In 
that sense, what GDPR protects is, basically, the inviolability of personal data: 
the data-privacy of the individual in a liberal sense. On doing so, GDPR places 
the burden of PDP on individuals and their isolated decisions, turning consent 
into a sort of private, «voluntary» contract between two unequal parts: the 
individual and the agent that collect, analyse and use her or his data.  
Nevertheless, that «contract» can be unilaterally broken in those cases re-
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than the right to PDP. In those cases, the cession of personal data is not «free» 
but «necessary». These include cases in which: its processing is necessary to 
protect the vital interest of the person; it is justified by legal obligations; for 
reasons of substantial public interest (including public safety and health); 
among others. Consent is neither required in case the data subject has dis-
closed them in a public space; or if the processing is carried out by an organi-
sation not-for-profit with a political, philosophical, religious or trade union 
aim, provided that the processing relates solely to members or to persons who 
have regular contact with it and that the personal data are not shared with 
third parties (Article 9, d). 
THE FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF THE DARK SIDE OF PRIVACY 
The division of the public and the private spheres in liberal theory and 
practice finds some of its greatest detractors in the feminist movement. Ac-
cording to Pateman (1989), the public/private dichotomy is what feminist 
political theory is fundamentally about. The feminist movement noticed the 
perversity of opposing the public to the private. On the one hand, feminists 
pointed at a dark side of privacy that has served to hide and legitimise the 
domination of women. On the other, they showed how personal circumstanc-
es are structured by public factors that provoke unequal social orders. The 
feminist movement stressed that a person cannot be as free and equal in her or 
his private sphere as those to whom he or she is subordinated in the public 
one. Furthermore, Pateman says, feminism has devoted great efforts to inves-
tigate the contradictions of the liberal state. It brags about stopping at the 
threshold of the private, while configuring the private by means of laws and 
policies that subordinate some citizens to others due to their gender, class or 
race. 
The personal is political 
The so-called second-wave feminist movement, which arises as part of the 
radical socialist politics from the 60s to the 80s, was particularly concerned 
about the problems of the traditional public/private dichotomy. As noted by 
Agra Romero (2012: 35-36), second-wave feminists «defied the very unques-
tioned grounds of both traditional and radical politics» and stood up for a 
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and of politics». They denaturalised the power asymmetries between men and 
women and redefined the limits of the ‘genuinely’ political. 
The claim «The personal is political», popularised by a paper published 
by Carol Hanisch in 1970 and revisited in 2006, delves into an alternative con-
ception of the public and the private. It came out as a reply to Dottie Zellner 
who criticised the actions of the Pro-Women Line faction, a specific subgroup 
within the radical Women’s Liberation Movement in New York. The main 
objective of this group was to bring women’s «personal problems» into the 
public arena, by recognizing «the need to fight male supremacy as a move-
ment instead of blaming the individual woman for her oppression» (Hanisch, 
2006: 1-2). Concerning this, Hanisch considers that individual struggle is al-
ways necessary. Even more because the oppression that affects the personal 
usually takes place in isolated circumstances, as the home. However, she clari-
fies that individual fight against oppression is limited for two main reasons: 
one is that when people are oppressed they act out of necessity, not out of 
choice; the other is that personal oppressive situations are often structured by 
public factors. Then, personal liberation is only possible by socially choosing 
to change the objective conditions of oppression, and this requires wondering 
about who benefits from this oppression. In other words, what Hanisch ex-
plains is that, to solve personal problems, their structural causes should be 
part of political discussions and actions. Otherwise, these causes become legit-
imate. 
In this respect, Federici’s (2004) work is enlightening. It focuses on the 
historical subordination of women to men and to the «domestic» (or the pri-
vate). Federici argues that this is not a causal relation, but the result of the 
transformations of gender relations prompted by early capitalist forms of ac-
cumulation that turn the female body into a means for the «re»production of 
labour. 
In line with this, Nancy Fraser (2012) defends the importance of question-
ing the liberal tendency to redefine structural inequities as personal problems. 
She expounds the need to investigate the reasons behind those interpretations 
that attribute people’s unfavourable circumstances to their own weaknesses. 
Instead of looking for individual panaceas to the problems that affect all of us, 
Fraser advocates examining biases of the public sphere that expose some per-
sons to different moral considerations that impede their equal access to the 
political voice.   
The feminist movement has interpreted Hanisch’ claim in various ways. 
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According to MacKinnon (1989), the right to privacy has failed to protect 
women’s inviolability. The public/private split has left the private domain out 
of any form of public scrutiny. Because of that, privacy has become closer to a 
right to impunity of those men who dominated, oppressed and degraded 
women, than a right to inviolability of the dominated. In MacKinnon’s words 
(1989: 191), «For women, the measure of the intimacy has been the measure of 
the oppression». In that light, she holds that feminism has to «explode» the 
private. 
For her part, Young (1987) defends that the determination of privacy 
must remain. She defines privacy as that aspect of the life and activity that any 
individual has a right to exclude others from, instead of understanding it as 
what is excluded from the public. In Young’s view, «the personal is political» 
does not imply denying the distinction between public and private spheres in 
itself, but the social division that their opposition leads to. The unified model 
of individuality that has been traditionally imposed in public life discrimi-
nates those who do not meet the average canons. It has set aside some persons 
from the public life by condemning some of their personal attributes or ac-
tions to remain private. Her proposal elaborates on a «heterogeneous» ideal of 
public life which recognises and appreciates the differences, instead of exclud-
ing them. Thereby, Young considers that, the defence of privacy «has become 
not merely a matter of keeping the state out of certain affairs, but asking for 
positive state action to ensure that the activities of nonstate organizations, 
such as corporations, respect the claims of individuals to privacy» (1987: 74). 
In this way, she recognises two principles following from Hanisch’s claim: «(a) 
no social institutions or practices should be excluded a priori as being the 
proper subject for public discussion and expression; and (b) no persons, ac-
tions or aspects of a person’s life should be forced into privacy.»  
Contrarily to Young, and similarly to Solove’s (2013) libertarian paternal-
ism, Allen (1999) advocates the need to «coerce privacy». A whole lifestyle 
premised on disclosure ought not to be an option. Therefore, she stands up for 
externally imposing individuals to keep some aspects of their lives in private. 
According to Allen, due to contemporary cumulative damages to privacy 
‒particularly generated by new technologies‒, people have «an ethical obliga-
tion to protect their own privacy». Then, they have to be forced «to have pri-
vate lives and to live their private lives in private» (1999: 752). Allen (2016) 
understands the protection of privacy as a ethical responsibility shared by 
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ernment has to be to protect some forms of privacy that individuals do not 
value.  
To sum up, while Young’s interpretation of the claim proposes an alterna-
tive conception of privacy to the liberal one, MacKinnon and Allen do not 
actually move away from privacy’s «inviolable» conception. 
 
FEMINISM FOR PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION 
The feminist struggles arise as a reaction to the historical subordination 
of women to men. The objective of feminist theory is to analyse the causes of 
this subordination and reverse them. It is precisely with the aim of putting an 
end to women’s inferiority of power that feminism brings to light the prob-
lems of privacy.  
Feminism, maintains Agra Romero (2012), is politics and is political theo-
ry. The experience of women has not only influenced and provoked changes at 
a personal and social level, but also at a theoretical level that pushes for re-
examining the domains of the political, and questioning the conventional op-
position of the public and the private spheres. Then, feminism should not be 
reduced to an ideology or a movement.  
Following Federici (2004: 13), feminist political theory has confirmed that 
«to look at history from a feminist viewpoint means to redefine in fundamen-
tal ways the accepted historical categories and to make visible hidden struc-
tures of domination and exploitation».  
«The personal is political» (Hanisch, 1970; 2006) expresses the need to 
overcome the liberal dualism in which the personal becomes depoliticised. It 
notes that this division leads to an exclusion of the problems that affect the 
personal from political discussion and action. The claim denounces the inabil-
ity of privacy to prevent situations of domination in the private sphere, by 
keeping out of public scrutiny the impunity of those who dominate. It also 
draws attention to the liberal tendency to look at social life exclusively in per-
sonal terms, and alerts about the importance of political actions to overcome 
domination in the personal sphere. 
Furthermore, a large part of feminist studies (Fraser, 2012; Hanisch, 1970; 
Pateman, 1989; Young, 1987) understand that overcoming the depoliticisation 
of the personal implies pursuing a different social order, based on a social 
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distinguished, but not opposed. With regards to this, García Manrique (2013), 
points out the importance of feminist's contributions to the terms in which 
private life must be sustained by a politically organised community. He notes 
that, although politics should not have to establish the conditions of the pri-
vate life, it must become aware that the private sphere depends on publicly 
imposed conditions. And also that freedom depends, too, on the conditions of 
the private life. Thus, the political community should not ignore private life, 
but rather it should enable and promote the conditions so that the private 
life can also contribute to everyone being equally free. 
These analysis and conclusions of the feminist critique of privacy are, 
from my point of view, applicable to other situations of inequality comparable 
to those that cause the subordination of women. I mean here to emphasise 
that the theoretical outcomes of the feminist movement are not only applica-
ble to women’s struggles, but also to diverse critical analysis of unequal social 
structures. As regard to this, the claim «the personal is political» may be, in 
my view, very illuminating to rethink PDP regulations. It shows us that the 
solution to the personal vulnerabilities caused by personal data’s massive ex-
ploitation cannot be restricted to isolated action. Moreover, that, even if the 
«agreement» between the citizen and a certain company that uses her or his 
data is a «private» relationship, the protection of personal data should be ex-
cluded from public scrutiny. 
In that light, equating the right to PDP with the inviolability of personal 
data blocks the possibilities of tackling the root causes of data domination. By 
establishing individual consent as the only mechanism citizens have to protect 
their data, GDPR confines people to individual resistance facing highly con-
centrated and organised markets, whose use of big data affects the personal 
affairs of all of us. On doing so, the Regulation cuts off the possibilities of 
giving a socially organised response to the implications of big data exploita-
tion. In that sense, GDPR replaces social protection by what Harvey (2004) 
calls a «personal responsibility system». A system devoid of democratic con-
trol where individual cessions shape the type of society where we all live.  Be-
sides, it confers the market the status of «appropriate guide» for the 
development of big data technologies. Within this situation, people’s options 
restrict to two: to trust the markets’ goodwill; or to act as technophobes, try-
ing to marginalise their own actions and beliefs from data accumulation. This 
situation entails the risk of entering privacy into a game of preferences that 
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Arruzza, Bhattacharya and Fraser (2019: 50) note that the effect of this 
system, rooted in the institutional structure of capitalism, «is to declare vast 
swaths of social life off limits to democratic control and turn them over to 
direct corporate domination». It fails to fulfil the supposed role of public in-
stitutions in contemporary welfare states: to replace the logic of the markets 
by an equal distribution of goods, through the recognition of a set of legal 
rights to all members of a political community (Marshall, 1950). On these 
grounds, it seems clear that we should not seek protection for personal data in 
darkness, secrecy and from the isolation. Rather, the answer must be, also, 
political. Moreover, feminism lays bare the need of protecting the personal 
from the subordination of the individual will, instead than only from its inter-
ference. 
CHANGING PERSPECTIVE 
In my view, the dark side of privacy is a consequence of defining its value 
in terms of (absence of) interferences. Within this framework, to ensure priva-
cy consists of building walls around the private and the personal to guard it 
from external interferences, but not from subordination. In the case of PDP, 
the role of the state restricts to guaranteeing the «self-management» of per-
sonal data. That is, that no one could force or prohibit another to consent the 
unwarranted publication, gathering or use of her or his data. Privacy in that 
sense lacks aspirations for equality in the private sphere by leaving outside its 
scope of protection the inequalities of power affecting private relations. This 
applies not only to the traditional conception of privacy, but also to some of 
its critics, such as Etzioni (1999), Solove (2003) or Allen (1999), who do not 
move significantly away from the definition of privacy in terms of non-
interference. 
Do these weaknesses of the liberal model of privacy mean that privacy is 
not a suitable value for underpinning PDP regulations? Should they lead us to 
forget the distinction between the public and the private? Certainly not. As I 
understand privacy, it is a sphere where we enjoy our freedom in a particularly 
individualised way. Therefore, the idea of freedom we refer to determines the 
way we understand privacy and the protection of the private-personal. This 
idea has been also noted by Roberts (2018: 6): «re-examining the beliefs that 
we hold about the nature of freedom ‒its constituent conditions‒ might, if it 
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Consequently, my proposal is not to reject or to restrict privacy as the ar-
ticulating value of PDP regulations, nor to reject or to restrict individual deci-
sion as the main mechanism to protect personal data. Rather, it seems 
necessary to defy the liberal hegemonic conception of privacy by rethinking 
its value from an alternative conception of freedom.  
The aim of this article is not to delve deeper into this issue. Even though, 
in the following lines I sketch out that a neo-republican conception of privacy 
would overcome the problems of liberal privacy, and so, it would be may be 
more suitable for protecting people from data domination.  
Neo-republicanism defines freedom as non-domination (Pettit, 1997; 2012). 
The main difference between liberal and republican freedom lies in the type 
of hindrances that they consider inimical to freedom. While liberalism con-
siders that there go against freedom all the interferences that modify the indi-
vidual will that guide a course of action; republicanism understands that a 
person is not free if he or she is exposed to another’s uncontrolled power of 
interference. Whether if this power affect directly or indirectly the individual 
capability of choosing a valuable course of action and carrying it out, and 
whether this power is actually exercised or just potential. By way of explanation, 
an agent may dominate another without actively interfering in any of her or 
his actions, as well as it is possible to interfere in the actions of an agent with-
out dominating him or her. In that line, Pettit notes that dominating relation-
ships can have their origin in consent in case it gives one party the 
uncontrolled capacity to influence the life of the other. Therefore, republican-
ism recognises the importance of power relations when thinking about free-
dom. Contrarily to liberal freedom, republican freedom tends to social equity. 
This implies that preventing one agent from dominating another is a way of 
ensuring the freedom of all, and not a form of limiting it. 
To be free in the republican sense means to not being exposed to any 
power of interference that one cannot autonomously control. In that sense, 
freedom requires a series of material and immaterial conditions that must be 
equally accessible by every citizen. The role of public powers is then to protect 
and resource citizens against domination, provided that this action of the 
state responds to the mandate of the citizenry (Pettit, 2012).  
Bertomeu and Domènech (2005) note that «X is strengthened in his civic-
political freedom by a more or less large core of constitutive (not purely in-
strumental) rights that no one can take away from him, nor can he himself 
alienate (sell or donate) at will, without losing his status of free citizen» (our 
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other goods or the public interest, lose their meaning, since relationships be-
tween rights become a matter of reciprocal necessity.  
Drawing on republican theory, privacy would be closer to a sphere free 
from arbitrary interferences in order to ensure individual’s will concerning 
private and personal issues, but also her or his ability and means to carry out 
such will. Privacy would still be a sphere governed by the individual will, 
shared with the subjects that the person wants and where the individual does 
what he or she wants to do. But, at the same time, it would allow to guard the 
individual from isolation when facing situations of oppression at a personal 
level. Contrarily to liberal privacy, republican privacy would protect the indi-
vidual not only from violations of her or his individual will regarding private 
issues, but also from the subordination to others’ wills.  
CONCLUSIONS 
Privacy is a distinctive value of liberalism. It underpins the European legal 
framework for PDP.  
From the lens of liberal theory, privacy is an «inviolable» sphere 
proof against others’ interferences. Ensuring privacy means guarding the indi-
vidual against the injury inflicted by invasions upon her or his personal affairs. 
This conception of privacy is unable to protect the individual from the subor-
dination of her or his will, as feminism has shown. 
The second-wave feminist claim «the personal is political» pushes for 
critically examining the traditional opposition between public and private 
spheres. Feminist theory notes that asymmetric power relations between «pri-
vate agents» give rise to the oppression of the less powerful agent. By keeping 
the causes of these inequalities away from public discussion and action, public 
institutions tend to naturalise the resulting subordination of ones to others 
and to redefine it as a «personal problem». A clear example is the historical 
subordination of women to men. On doing so, politics relegates the resolution 
of these problems to individual fights, complicating to tackle their root causes 
as a society.  
Beyond being a key element in women’s struggles, this feminist critique of 
privacy represents a substantial contribution in theoretical terms. This article 
shows that it is an illuminating approach to reviewing the meaning and scope 
of PDP regulations. Looking at PDP from a feminist point of view means: 
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in order to overcome the depoliticisation of personal data protection. Second-
ly, to make visible the hidden structures of domination behind the massive 
exploitation of personal data. Thirdly, to stop thinking that individual action 
is the only way to freely protect personal data. Society has to use its ability to 
decide collectively which would be the best way to protect personal data. 
Keeping this in mind, my proposal is not to reject or to restrict privacy as 
the articulating value of PDP regulations. I stand up for defying the liberal 
conception of privacy in light of the republican conception of freedom as non-
domination and so, recognizing the social dimension of the right to PDP. This 
does not mean one has to force people to keep hidden their personal data, nor 
to take decisions about the protection of their data in a particular sense. It is 
about to ensure that individual decisions regarding private issues are not (di-
rectly or indirectly) subordinated to others’ interests. Consequently, it is criti-
cal to reduce the factors that give a few corporations the power to undermine 
citizens’ ability to act autonomously for the protection of their personal data.  
This requires that public institutions replace the logic of data business for 
the logic of fundamental rights, limiting the unbridled expansion of the mar-
kets to data. It is essential to promote the widest possible public debate on the 
development of big data technologies and personal data protection regula-
tions, even questioning its conceptual foundations. Public institution should 
support this debate by providing mechanisms of transparency, external con-
trol and accountability of big data technologies and data-driven corporations. 
All this would legitimate political actions to ensure everyone’s possibilities to 
detect and protest against unfair big data exploitation practices, and to take 
free decisions about their personal data away from the pressures of data busi-
ness. 
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